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TESTING THE MAN-RATED LAUNCH VEHICLE

Francis X. Carey
Martin Company
Cocoa Beach, Florida
From this mathematical relationship, it
can be seen that achieving a satisfactory
level of probability of crew survival
required that careful consideration be
given to such launch vehicle items as:

Although manned space flight is still in
its infancy, testing of launch vehicles
has progressed to a high degree of so
phistication.
As of December 1965, the Martin-built
Gemini launch vehicle has launched
seven Gemini spacecraft successfully
out of seven attempts. This remarkable
record was made possible by two facts:
1.

The basic reliability of the
hardware

2.

The test program.

This paper briefly describes the Gemini
launch vehicle noting the major differ
ences between it and the Titan II and
discusses the test program. It is not
proposed that this is the only method
of testing a man-rated launch vehicle;
however, it is a successful one.
The Gemini launch vehicle is a basic
Air Force Titan II which has been modi
fied in certain areas to achieve manrating (see Figure 1).
Launch Vehicle Man-Rating
Man-rating is the philosophy and plan
for marshaling the disciplines necess
ary to achieve a satisfactory proba
bility of mission success and crew
survival. This probability may be
expressed in terms of reliability of
the malfunction detection and escape
systems. Mathematically, these terms
are linked in the equation:
= R LV

PCS

Component and/or system, redundancy
which can improve the reliability
of the launch vehicle

2.

Analysis of launch vehicle failure
modes followed by design of a re
liable malfunction detection system
or MDS

3.

Functional utilization of the crew
as part of the malfunction detection
system

4.

Emphasis in launch vehicle checkout
on minimizing the possibility of
launching a bad vehicle

5.

Test, countdown, and launch proced
ures that will lead to maximum
probability of launching a good
vehicle

6.

System simplification where possible
to achieve reliability.

Man-rating a Titan II is a many-sided
process conceived by Martin and the Air
Force to improve the reliability of the
basic vehicle by modifying existing sys
tems, by using redundant components, by
adding special systems for crew safety
purposes, by special handling of critical
components, by meticulous selection of
qualified people, and by developing pro
cedures in the entire design-productionmanufacturing-test-launch cycle that es
tablishes as a goal flawless performance
from the launch vehicle.

*MDS

where:

RT XT

1.

Titan II Modifications for Gemini

= probability of crew survival

The high reliability of the ultimate manrated Gemini-Titan launch vehicle was the
result of two decisions made early in the
program by Martin and Air Force engineers--

= reliability of the launch
vehicle
= reliability of the malfunction
detection and escape systems.
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first, to make as few changes as possible
in the basic Titan II and secondly, to
make every necessary change count toward
overall reliability. Each of the modifi
cations added to reliability and safety
and contributed to man-rating.

with one important exception: ASIS was
completely automatic (after a serious
malfunction was discovered, ASIS auto
matically initiated mission abort),
while MDS only provides vehicle condi
tion information to the astronauts. In
other words, MDS signals to the astronaut
the proper or improper functioning of the
launch vehicle and allows him to make the
decision as to whether to continue the
mission in the event of a malfunction or
when to abort the mission if this should
become necessary. Only in the event of
an engine hardover condition does the MDS
automatically act and in this case, only
to switch over to redundant hydraulic,
flight control, and electrical systems,
not to abort the mission. As a result,
the MDS is a relatively simple system
with a high degree of reliability. It
takes advantage of one of the lessons of
Project Mercury - that man can function
in space as a working pilot, not just as
a passenger in his spacecraft. The MDS,
which is completely redundant, monitors
during flight: propellant tank pressures,
staging of the launch vehicle, thrust
chamber pressures, electrical system volt
age, and turning rates which would indi
cate a need for action if the launch
vehicle structural limits are approached.

The major modifications, accepted only
after careful review by a top level Air
Force-Martin engineering board, were:
1.

The addition of a malfunction de
tection system designed to sense
problems in any of the vital
booster systems and transmit this
information to the astronaut crew

2.

A redundant flight control system
which could take over should the
primary system fail in flight

3.

Redundancy in the electrical sys
tem with necessary changes to
provide power for such added
launch vehicle equipment as the
MDS

4.

Substitution of radio guidance
for inertial guidance used in the
Titan II ICBM version to provide
a weight reduction and also to
provide a more responsive system
during critical orbital injection

5.

Redundancy in the hydraulic sys
tems where desirable for pilot
sa±£ry, sucn as hydraulic actua
tors for engine gimbaling

6.

Instrumentation to provide addi
tional data during pre-flight
checkout and flight not considered
necessary in the ICBM version.

Hydraulic System
The launch vehicle's hydraulic systems
control the position of the Stage I and
Stage II rocket engine thrust chambers
in response to electrical signals from
the flight control system. Changing the
thrust direction in this manner, the
launch vehicle is steered along the de
sired line-of-flight by making corrections
in pitch or yaw axes. The thrust chambers
are gimbal-mounted to allow two degrees of
freedom. Stage I roll control is provided
also by varying direction of the two
thrust chambers. A separate roll control
nozzle with one degree of freedom is pro
vided in Stage II which has one thrust
chamber.

Malfunction Detection System
The malfunction detection system (MDS)
(Figure 2) is perhaps the most signifi
cant modification made to Titan II to
prepare it for the manned Gemini mis
sion. The MDS monitors operation of
vital launch vehicle subsystems and
signals the spacecraft crew if a mal
function takes place. The Gemini-Titan
MDS is comparable in function to the
launch vehicle ASIS (Abort Sensing and
Implementation System) of Project Mercury

The Gemini-Titan launch vehicle has three
separate hydraulic systems - the Stage I
primary system, the Stage I secondary sys
tem, and the Stage II system. A schematic
of the redundant Stage I hydraulic system
is shown in Figure 3.
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chamber for pitch and yaw control, and
one on :he off-center turbine exhaust
nozzle for roll control.

Stage I Primary, Basic components
of the Stage I primary hydraulic system
are an engine-driven pump, an accumula
tor/reservoir, four servo actuators,
and an electric motor-driven pump. An
axial piston, pressure-compensated,
variable volume engine-driven pump
pressurizes the system at 3000 psi
during Stage I flight. The pump is
driven by the accessory drive pad on
the turbodrive assembly of the Stage I
engine. The servo actuators control
the movement of the Stage I thrust
chambers. The actuators are built as
tandem units consisting of two complete
electro-hydraulic servo system sections.
One servo section of each actuator is
connected to the primary hydraulic sys
tem; the other servo actuator section
in each actuator comprising a portion
of a secondary or redundant hydraulic
system* The actuator sections are in
dependent but interconnected by a
special "switchover"valve that permits
only one of the servo sections to be
operable at any given time.

The Gemini-Titan flight control system
constitutes a basic change from the
Titan ICBM system. Specifically, the
system is designed to withstand any
single malfunction (failure) and com
plete the launch phase successfully.
The design achieves this increased re
liability by complete flight control
system redundancy (Figure 4) .
A complete secondary or redundant flight
control system is provided in the GeminiTitan launch vehicle to protect the
astronaut crew from this one event.
Switchover from the primary to second
ary system in the event of an engine
hardover condition is automatic and
requires only 15 milliseconds. The
switchover is final and no provision
is made for switching back during Stage
I flight. After staging, the pilot may
switch back to the primary mode.
Switchover to the secondary system
also can be effected by three other
methods:

Stage I Secondary. The secondary
or redundant Stage I hydraulic system
is identical to the primary system. It
operates in line with the secondary or
redundant flight control system. The
same electric motor-driven pump is used
for both secondary and primary systems
during checkout through use of a system
test selector valve. The secondary sys
tem is pressurized throughout flight,
although not in use unless switchover
occurs. The actuator switchover valves
are designed to sense primary system
pressure and initiate switchover to the
secondary hydraulic system in case of
any failure within the primary system
that would result in a loss or degrada
tion of pressure below a predetermined
value.

1.

Astronaut command

2.

Vehicle overrate detected by the
MDS rate sensors

3.

Loss of Stage I primary hydraulic
system pressure.

The primary flight control system con
sists of the following:
1.

Stage II. The Stage II hydraulic
system is not redundant since studies
of potential malfunctions did not indi
cate a necessity for redundancy such as
is the case in the event of an engine
hardover condition at Max Q in Stage I.
The components of the Stage II system
are basically the same as for the Stage
I systems except that three actuators
are used - two on the single thrust

334

Three Axis Reference System (TARS).
Flight-proven and adapted from the
Titan I ICBM program, the TARS is
located in the equipment bay between
the tanks of Stage II. It provides
information concerning angular dis
placement along the three perpen
dicular axes of roll, pitch, and
yaw by use of gyroscopes. Included
in the TARS unit is a programmer
which, as a function of time during
Stage I flight, changes the angular
reference of the launch vehicle in
the pitch and roll axes, thereby

initiating changes in the direction
of flight along these two axes
according to a preplanned flight
trajectory. In other words, it
serves a guidance function in Stage
I flight signaling commands to such
other units as hydraulics by way of
the adapter package and autopilot.
The roll programmer can be continu
ally updated during the prelaunch
countdown to set a new azimuth,
such as might be necessary in a
rendezvous mission to achieve the
correct orbital plane. The pitch
program is not changed during
countdown since it is fixed ahead
of time for each individual
mission* During Stage II flight,
the TARS accepts steering signals
or angular reference changes in
pitch and yaw from the radio guid
ance system and executes these
commands by again signaling other
components of the flight control
system. The TARS also actuates
auxiliary switches in accordance
with a preset time program to pro
vide such functions as arming of
the sensors which signal stage
separation at the proper point in
flight.

ponents of the launch vehicle's
angular rate during Stage I flight.
The rate gyro output signals are
supplied to the autopilot.

Adapter Package. The adapter pack
age, also located between the Stage
II tanks, conditions the attitude
outputs of the TARS for input in
the autopilot. At the proper time
as programmed in the TARS, the
adapter allows the pitch and yaw
steering signals from the radio
guidance system to be applied to
the TARS guidance amplifiers. The
adapter package also houses the
switchover relays (redundant) which
effect the primary-secondary flight
control system shift. During check
out of the booster, performance of
all fifteen flight control system
gyros are monitored through sig
nals amplified by the adapter pack
age.
Stage I Rate Gyro. Located in the
inter-stage section, the Stage I
rate gyro is a Titan II flight con
trol unit. It contains three gyros
to measure pitch, roll, and yaw com

4.

Autopilot. The autopilot is located
between the Stage II tanks and is
modified from the Titan ICBM auto
pilot only where necessary to meet
specific Gemini mission requirements.
Included in the autopilot are: three
axes rate gyros for Stage II flight;
an 800 cycle static inverter provid
ing magnetic amplifier and rate gyro
power supply for both Stage I and
Stage II rate gyros; and circuitry
necessary to accept signals from
Stage I and Stage II rate gyros and
to amplify, distribute, and condition
attitude reference signals from the
adapter package to the hydraulic
servo actuators.

5.

Mod III G Radio Guidance. The radio
guidance system, discussed in detail
in another section, provides pitch
and yaw guidance signals to the TARS
through the adapter package during
Stage II flight.

6.

The secondary or redundant flight
control system consists of the
following components:
(1) Stage I
rate gyro: a duplicate of the pri
mary system unit (2) Autopilot:
primary system duplicate.

7.

Spacecraft Inertial Guidance System.
The spacecraft IGS provides those
attitude stabilization signals to
the secondary system autopilot which
would have been provided during Stage
I flight in the primary system by the
TARS and during Stage II flight by
the radio guidance system. The inertial guidance system is pre-programmed
to perform this function in the event
of switchover to the secondary system.
Gemini Test Program

The test program on the Gemini launch vehi
cle is a repetitive series of detailed,
quantitative tests starting at the Vertical
Test Fixture in the Martin Company's manu
facturing plant at Baltimore, Maryland and
culminating in the launch from Complex 19
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viewed by the responsible design engineers
for specification compliance and entered
on the trend charts (see Figure 6).

at Cape Kennedy, Florida.
In developing this program, great care
was taken to have the tests and proced
ures at both facilities as nearly iden
tical as possible. The aerospace ground
equipment, with the exception of the
propellant loading system, at both fa
cilities are identical.

When the individual subsystems have been
verified, each of the 235 airborne telem
etry measurements is calibrated - usually
four to six points - and data reduction
curves are drawn.

The data gathered in the Vertical Test
Fixture is plotted and analyzed by the
system designer to verify initial per
formance. Each time a test is repeated,
the data is compared with the original.
All this test data accompanies the
vehicle to Martin's Canaveral Division
at Cape Kennedy where the process is
continued.

The next step in the subsystem test se
quence is the telemetry ambient test.
Here, the individual subsystems are exer
cised in a tightly-controlled sequence
while the airborne telemetry system is on
and radiating and recordings of this data
are made. The data is reduced and entered
in the launch vehicle Data Book for future
reference and use as a data reduction tool.

Factory Test and Vehicle Acceptance

Systems Tesj:. The first major system test
which the launch vehicle undergoes is the
Acceptance Mode Verification Test. This
test is quite similar to the Combined Sys
tem Acceptance Test and the combined system
tests at Cape Kennedy in that a short minus
time countdown is conducted, followed by a
simulated flight. This data is again re
viewed by the design groups and used as a
baseline for the launch vehicle.

The sequence of testing and acceptance
at the Vertical Test Fixture is shown
in Figure 5. A brief description of
these activities follows.
Launch Vehicle Erection and Alignment.
The vehicle is erected and checked for
vertical alignment structural twist and
levelness of the gyro mounting pads.

Combined System Acceptance Test. The Com
bined System Acceptance Test specifies in
detail the steps necessary to bring the
launch vehicle and aerospace ground equip
ment from a static power-off condition to
a countdown configuration. In addition,
it gives direction for performing an
abbreviated count and two simulated flights
(for details, see section on Cape Kennedy
Tests).

Post-Erection Inspection. Approximately
one week is allotted for a complete
physical inspection of the vehicle
structure, cabling, and black box
installations prior to initiating the
subsystem test phase.
Subsystem Functional Verification.
Verification of the launch vehicle sub
systems commences with voltage standing
wave ratio and attenuation tests of the
waveguide and radio frequency cabling
and resistance checks of the auxiliary
and instrumentation busses. Power is
then applied to the individual busses
and systems sequentially.

Launch Vehicle Acceptance. The data from
the Combined System Acceptance Test and
all manufacturing and test data are pre
pared and presented to the Vehicle Accept
ance Team by Martin management and engin
eering personnel for their review. The
Vehicle Acceptance Team is chaired by a
senior officer of the Air Force Space
Systems Division Gemini Program Office
in Los Angeles and is composed of manage
ment and technical specialists from the
Air Force, NASA, and Aerospace Corporation.
When the Vehicle Acceptance Team determines,
through its own analysis of the launch vehi
cle history and test data, that the launch

The launch vehicle subsystems, i. e.,
electrical, flight controls, tracking
and radio frequency, propulsion, mal
function detection system, and instru
mentation are now subjected to the
first of the series of meticulous tests
which finally culminate in the launch
from Cape Kennedy. All data is re

336

vehicle meets the stringent requirements
of the Gemini program, it is accepted by
the Air Force and prepared for shipment
to Cape Kennedy.

detection system; and a simulated flight
terminating at sustainer engine cutoff.
An electronic spacecraft simulator is
used to provide proper electrical loads
and simulated guidance signals to the
launch venxci.e. All systems are then
recycled to T-3 minutes and another
countdown ensues. During the plus time
run of this second simulated flight, the
launch vehicle remains in the primary
guidance and flight control mode. Veri
fication of correct response to the pitch
and roll program from the Three Axis
Reference System as well as steering
commands from the radio guidance system
and system response to discrete commands,
i. e., gain change, staging arm, booster
engine cutoff, and sustainer engine cut
off is made. The launch vehicle systems
are again recycled to a T-3 minute prelaunch configuration for a third and
final simulated flight. During the plus
time run for this test, all launch vehicle
umbilicals are removed in their normal
sequence. At the normal staging time,
booster engine cutoff, the electrical
connectors at the staging interface
plane are disconnected. The launch vehi
cle is evaluated not only for response
to proper commands but also to ensure
that there is no improper subsystem
interaction.

Cape Kennedy Tests
The pre-launch testing at Cape Kennedy
and the Air Force Eastern Test Range can
be divided into two phases:
1.

Launch vehicle

2.

Integrated launch vehicle and
spacecraft.

Launch Vehicle
Subsystem, The first portion of
the testing at the Cape is quite simi
lar to the testing at the Vertical Test
Fixture in Baltimore (see Figure 7),
However, in place of the subsystem
functionals, an abbreviated subsystem
retest has been substituted. This
abridged testing in no way detracts
from our confidence in launch vehicle
performance. Rather, it is made possi
ble by our test philosophy which dic
tated that all test data remained with
the vehicle until launch. It is there
fore possible for the data recorded at
the Cape to be compared with the
acceptance data and analyzed for trends
indicative of an incipient failure.
This analysis is performed concurrently
by the Martin Company Project Engineer
ing Section at the Canaveral Division
and by the various design groups at the
Baltimore Division. It should be noted
that this data comparison and trend
analysis do not cease when the individ
ual subsystems have been reverified.
The subsystem retest data is added to
the vehicle history and compared with
the data gathered in all the combined
tests which follow (Figure 8).

Most of the combined launch vehicle and
spacecraft testing is done on a system
basis. However, since the inertial guid
ance system is used as the secondary
launch vehicle guidance system, subsystem
testing, i. e., detailed quantitative
verification of system gain and response
is performed. Likewise, since the primary
purpose of the malfunction detection system
is to inform the pilots of vehicle per
formance, this subsystem also undergoes
more detail verification of the interface.

System. The launch vehicle is
declared ready to accept the spacecraft
upon the successful completion of the
Pre-mate Combined System Test. The Premate Combined System Test consists of a
countdown from T-45 minutes through T~0;
a simulated liftoff; switchover to the
secondary guidance and flight control
system initiated by the malfunction

Electrical Interface Integrated Vali
dation. All interface wiring across the
launch vehicle/spacecraft interface is
redundant. To ensure that this is true,
each circuit is subjected to a power-off
resistance test with first one and then
the other electrical interface connector
connected. When verification of the proper
resistance on all circuits is complete.

Combined Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft
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system performs properly by making de
tailed, quantitative measurements of the
attitude and rate gains. Proper system
phasing is determined by placing the
inertial platform in the inertial mode
and utilizing the earth's rotation to
generate an output to the flight control
system.

both connectors are mated and the com
plete launch vehicle/spacecraft is ready
for functional test. Some of the func
tional tests which the space system is
subjected to and a brief description of
each follows.
Liftoff and Test Conductor Abort.
Verifies that when the launch vehicle
lifts off the spacecraft receives the
proper indication. Verifies that the
test conductor abort command is re
ceived by the spacecraft by both radio
frequency and landline methods.

Joint Combined Systems Test
The Joint Combined Systems Test is the
first major exercise of the complete
space system and is designed to verify
compatibility of the launch vehicle and
spacecraft in a simulated flight config
uration. This test consists of:

Ascent Simulation. The Ascent Sim
ulation is quite similar to the first
run of the Pre-mate Combined System
Test. However, the spacecraft inertial
guidance system now furnishes the pitch
and roll programs, certain steering
commands, and discrete commands to the
launch vehicle. Switchover to the
secondary guidance and control system
is initiated by the pilot.
Fade-in Demonstration. Verifies
that when the space system switches
ftom primary to secondary guidance and
control the inertial guidance system
computer recognizes the amount of atti
tude error and corrects the flight path
over a period of time rather than apply
ing a step function.

1.

An abbreviated countdown and liftoff
followed by a simulated abort initia
ted by the pi lot

2.

The launch vehicle and spacecraft
are then recycled to T-45 minutes
for a countdown and simulated flight
utilizing the primary guidance and
flight control system.

Simulated Flight Test
The Simulated Flight Test is the final
exercise of the complete launch vehicle/
spacecraft system prior to initiating the
launch countdown* This test consists of
three simulated countdowns and flights
which are identical to tests previously
described, i. e,, abort, secondary guid
ance and control, and primary guidance
and control. Immediately following the
Simulated Flight Test, the launch vehicle
is declared ready for flight and special
quality and security procedures are put
in effect to ensure system integrity is
maintained.

Fuel and Oxidizer Tank Pressure
Meter Calibration, A three-point cali
bration and comparison of the malfunc
tion detection system propellant tank
pressure transducers and spacecraft
analog meters.
Primary to Secondary Switchover
Test, Verifies that each of the hy
draulic inputs to the malfunction
detection system will initiate switch
over independently.

Launch Countdown
Since the launch vehicle and spacecraft
are both relatively complex systems and
independent during normal flight, a split
countdown was developed for Gemini (see
Figure 9). The split count allows for
maximum flexibility and minimum inter
dependence between the two systems during
the countdown.

Staging Interface, Verifies the
spacecraft receives proper indication
of launch vehicle staging.
Joint Guidance and Controls Test
The Joint Guidance and Controls Test
assures that the launch vehicle/space
craft secondary guidance and control

The launch count commences on F-l day
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approximately nineteen hours prior to
launch. In a four-hour period, all of
the launch vehicle/spacecraft interface
is reverified. The count is then held
until T-360 minutes on launch day. It
is during this hold that the launch
vehicle is loaded with propellants and
final topping of some of the spacecraft
cryogenics is accomplished.

engineering changes, production, inspec
tion, testing, handling, acceptance and
launch; emphasis on configuration docu
mentation and verification control; and
extensive data and procedural reviews.
As part of the pilot safety program, the
Air Force imposes stringent requirements
during the acceptance phase. Hardware is
not accepted until the Air Force is con
vinced that the hardware and documenta
tion comply with appropriate specifica
tions and other contractual requirements
and meet the requirements for the Gemini
mission. Acceptance is characterized by
a methodical approach and an uncompro
mising attitude.

The Range count is initiated at T-240
minutes with the spacecraft and launch
vehicle counting independently. It
should be noted that one of the major
precepts of the Gemini test philosophy
dictated that the launch vehicle be
completely verified as ready for flight
prior to crew ingress (T-95 minutes).
Therefore, there are no tests performed
after ingress that have not been per
formed earlier in the count.

In discussing the pilot safety program,
this paper is confined to its influence
and impact on the pre-launch test program.

After crew ingress, the countdown with the exception of the mechanical
functions necessary to lower the erec
tor and prepare the stand for launch is an exact replica of the count per
formed for the Pre-mate Combined Systems
Test, Joint Combined Systems Test, and
Simulated Flight Test,

Test Procedure Control
The Gemini test procedures used at Cape
Kennedy are written by the Canaveral
Division of the Martin Company. These
basic procedures are prepared by the
engineers assigned to the Launch Opera
tions Section and are governed by con
tractual and engineering specifications.
The Gemini test procedures are written
in considerable detail, leaving nothing
to the discretion of the operator. The
specification revision designation is
noted on the draft.

For a closer insight into the problems
associated with planning and conducting
a countdown, see "Rendezvous Launch Op
erations Planning."^

The procedure is then forwarded to
Configuration Management where it is
verified that the 'written to 1 level of
the referenced specifications is the
latest released engineering. This is
performed using a computer tab run
which is updated daily.

A launch vehicle pilot safety program
has been established by the Air Force
Space Systems Division to ensure that
a concern for safety is manifested in
plans, reflected in appropriate activity,
adequately documented, and thoroughly
assessed prior to launch. The program
is implemented in two ways. First, the
program ensures a continuous monitoring
effort commencing with the preliminary
design and continuing through launch.
Second, the program concentrates con
siderable effort at key focal points
when major problems arise. Assurance
that nothing has been neglected is pro
vided by following a pattern of rigorous
technical monitoring of associate con
tractors' activity; rigid control of
all phases of design, development,

The procedure next is routed to the
Gemini Project Engineering and Quality
Engineering sections for reverification
of technical adequacy, specification
compliance, and adherence to Martin
quality standards.
The Pilot Safety engineer reviews the
procedure for compliance with the total
pilot safety program.
The procedure is then forwarded to the
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flight development effort.

customer, i. e., the 6555th Aerospace
Test Wing, for review and coordination.
After all approvals are secured and all
agencies satisfied, the procedure is
published and released for use (Figure
10).

Another aspect of the pilot safety program one which cannot be over-emphasized - is
the motivation and skill of the launch
crew. Each and every technician and engin
eer working on the program must be aware of
his responsibility for pilot safety. For
in the final analysis, all of the manage
ment effort, data reviews, trend analysis,
and basic vehicle reliability can be ne
gated by an undetected human error „

Now, the typical procedure .starts through
the test cycle. The Official Test Copy
(OTC) is issued to the responsible sys
tem engineer in accordance with the test
schedule. Attached to the Official Test
Copy are several Procedure History Sheets
for documenting all pertinent facts,
deviations, and anomalies concerning the
test. The complete package is bound and
sealed by the Quality Section to assure
that all pages remain in the Official
Test Copy.

The average man assigned to the Gemini.
launch team has over seven years of
Martin launch experience. Most of this
experience was on the earlier Titan I
and Titan II vehicles. Nevertheless,
upon transfer to the Gemini program,
they were again subjected to rigorous
classroom training, written and oral
exams, and performance demonstrations
before being certified as team members.
This training has continued throughout
the program,

After the completion of the procedure,
a post-test critique meeting is held
during which all recorded data and Pro
cedure History Sheet items are reviewed
and accepted or rejected. Present at
this meeting and responsible for verify
ing that the data is satisfactory and
the system is performing properly, are
the Operations engineer and the appro
priate system engineers from the Project
Engineering and Quality Engineering
sections.

Methods of motivating people to assure
maximum quality vary from the classical
poster "Uncle Sam Wants You" to pep talks
and lectures. The ones which seem to
have worked on Gemini are the sense of
identification with the program and the
pride in a job well done. These have
been greatly enhanced by the almost daily
contact with the flight crews, the estab
lishment of many space records for the
United States, and the many words and
letters of commendation from the Air
Force, NASA, and the 'guys who drive
them 1 .

The test procedure and all associated
data, i. e., strip charts or other re
cordings, are then forwarded to the
Quality data storage area for review
by the Pilot Safety Working Team.
The Pilot Safety Working Team consists
of representatives of Martin Company
Engineering Section; Customer Quality7
Aerospace Corporation; and the 6555th
Aerospace Test Wing. They conduct a
separate review to assure completeness
of the documentation and procedure.

versus Program Needs
The confidence level necessary to commit
to a manned launch is achieved incrementally during the test program for each
launch. Affecting this 'confidence' are
the results of the previous f lights f the
Vertical Test Fixture tests, and Eastern
Test Range tests, the data and trend analy
sis, and the performance of the launch
crew.

It is readily recognizable that these
additional reviews and reverification
of the documentation add considerable
cost to a program over and above what
would normally be expected in a weapon
system development program. From a
launch operations standpoint, it can
be estimated this cost as approxi
mately thirty per cent over a normal

Assuming that this is true, the question
naturally arises as to how the Gemini 7
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and 6 mission was possible. The answer
is simple. The Gemini 7 and 6 mission
was possible because of the Gemini test
philosophy.
GT-6 was completely checked out accord
ing to the normal Gemini schedule, in
cluding a launch countdown which termi
nated prematurely due to a target vehicle
problem, GT-6 had performed perfectly
during all phases of the ground test and
analysis of the test data showed no
trends indicative of a potential problem.
Extreme care was exercised in removing
it from the launch complex. Only those
electrical connectors at the staging and
spacecraft interface planes were discon
nected, making the retest minimal.
After re-erection, the individual sub
systems were reverified, using somewhat
abbreviated procedures prior to the
Simulated Flight Test. From the Simu
lated Flight Test through to launch,
normal procedures were followed. The
data from the Simulated Flight Test
was compared by use of a computer with
the Simulated Flight Test performed
prior to the first launch attempt and
found to be an overlay. The launch
vehicle was again performing perfectly
according to the engineering criteria
and the emotional criteria of confidence
was satisfied.
Although the Gemini test program is con
trolled by very rigid application of the
engineering and quality disciplines as
outlined in the procedural control,
data and trend analysis, and pilot
safety program, it has maintained the
flexibility to respond to changing pro
gram needs.
References:
1.

Rendezvous Launch Operations
Planning by Mark Goodkind,
Proceedings of Third Space Congress
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Rendezvous guidance
& recovery system
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No.
1.

Meaa
No.
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80O CPS Inverter
Voltage
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Time Ref.
T±. L0±
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ETR Testa

EIIV (ETR

Date 6-25-65
Date 9-20-65
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Date 9-16-65
Test No. 5547

Date 9-23-65
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"•» 1051oi5

Date 10 -?-65

Ten No. -* 901
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(See Note 1)

109.8

109.90
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N/A
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-0.063
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-0.081

NOTES:
Note 1 J
2.

Ecp 517R2 added a time delay relay | New. time and tolerance effective
all ETR tests is 110,00 *_ 1,22 seconds,
Launch Attempt on 10/25 65 configuration was number 8,
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